Froggystyle
08-24-2005, 07:26 AM
Sent to me...
On the 22nd of July, Admiral Mike Mullin became the Chief of Naval
Operations. Below is his speech.
Subject: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS SPEECH
AmericaÂ’s military can win wars. WeÂ’ve done it in the past, and I have
absolute confidence that weÂ’ll continue to do it in the future. WeÂ’ve won fights
in which we possessed overwhelming technological superiority (Desert Storm), as
well as conflicts in which we were the technical underdogs (the American
Revolution). WeÂ’ve crossed swords with numerically superior foes, and with
militaries a fraction of the size of our own. WeÂ’ve battled on our own soil, and
on the soil of foreign lands — on the sea, under the sea, and in the skies.
WeÂ’ve even engaged in a bit of cyber-combat, way out there on the electronic
frontier. At one time or another, weÂ’ve done battle under just about every
circumstance imaginable, armed with everything from muskets to cruise missiles.
And, somehow, weÂ’ve managed to do it all with the wrong Army.
ThatÂ’s right, America has the wrong Army. I donÂ’t know how it happened, but
it did. We have the wrong Army. ItÂ’s too small; itÂ’s not deployed properly;
itÂ’s inadequately trained, and it doesnÂ’t have the right sort of logistical
support. ItÂ’s a shambles. I have no idea how those guys even manage to fight.
Now, before my brothers and sisters of the OD green persuasion get their fur
up, I have another revelation for you.
We also have the wrong Navy. And if you want to get down to brass tacks,
weÂ’ve got the wrong Air Force, the wrong Marine Corps, and the wrong Coast Guard.
DonÂ’t believe me? Pick up a newspaper or turn on your television.
In the past week, IÂ’ve watched or read at least a dozen commentaries on the
strength, size, and deployment of our military forces. All of our uniform
services get called on the carpet for different reasons, but our critics
unanimously agree that weÂ’re doing pretty much everything wrong.
I think itÂ’s sort of a game. The critics wonÂ’t tell you what the game is
called, so I’ve taken the liberty of naming it myself. I call it the ‘No Right
AnswerÂ’ game. ItÂ’s easy to play, and it must be a lot of fun because politicos
and journalists canÂ’t stop playing it.
IÂ’ll teach you the rules. HereÂ’s Rule #1: No matter how the U.S.
military is organized, itÂ’s the wrong force. Actually, thatÂ’s the only rule
in this game. We donÂ’t really need any other rules, because that one applies
in all possible situations. Allow me to demonstrateÂ…
If the Air ForceÂ’s fighter jets are showing their age, critics will tell us
that Air Force leaders are mismanaging their assets, and endangering the
safety of their personnel. If the Air Force attempts to procure new fighter jets,
they are shopping for toys and that money could be spent better elsewhere.
Are you getting the hang of the game yet? ItÂ’s easy; keeping old planes is the
wrong answer, but getting new planes is also the wrong answer. There is no
right answer, not ever.
IsnÂ’t that fun?
It works everywhere. When the Army is small, itÂ’s TOO small. Then we
start to hear phrases like ‘over-extended’ or ’spread too thin,’ and the
integrity of our national defense is called into question. When the Army is
large, itÂ’s TOO large, and itÂ’s an unnecessary drain on our economy. Terms like
‘dead weight,’ and ‘dead wood’ get thrown around.
I know what youÂ’re thinking. We could build a medium-sized Army, and
everyone would be happy. Think again. A medium-sized Army is too small to deal with
large scale conflicts, and too large to keep military spending properly
muzzled. The naysayers will attack any middle of the road solution anyway, on the
grounds that it lacks a coherent strategy.
So small is wrong, large is wrong, and medium-sized is also wrong. Now
youÂ’re starting to understand the game. Is this fun, or what?
No branch of the military is exempt. When the Navy builds aircraft carriers,
we are told that we really need small, fast multipurpose ships. When the
Navy builds small, fast multi-mission ships (aka the Arleigh Burke class), weÂ’re
told that blue water ships are poorly suited for littoral combat, and we
really need brown water combat ships. The NavyÂ’s answer, the Littoral Combat,
isnÂ’t even off the drawing boards yet, and the critics are already calling it
pork barrel politics and questioning the need for such technology. Now IÂ’ve
gone nose-to-nose with hostiles in the littoral waters of the Persian Gulf, and
I canÂ’t recall that pork or politics ever entered into the conversation. In
fact, IÂ’d have to say that the people trying to kill me and my shipmates were
positively disinterested in the internal wranglings of our military
procurement process. But, had they been aware of our organizational folly, they could
have hurled a few well-timed criticisms our way, to go along with the mines
we were trying to dodge.
The fun never stops when we play the ‘No Right Answer’ game. If we
centralize our military infrastructure, the experts tell us that we are vulnerable to
attack. WeÂ’re inviting another Pearl Harbor. If we decentralize our
infrastructure, weÂ’re sloppy and overbuilt, and the BRAC experts break out the
calculators and start dismantling what they call our excess physical capacity.Â’ If
we leave our infrastructure unchanged, we are accused of becoming stagnant in
a dynamic world environment.
Even the lessons of history are not sacrosanct. When we learn from the
mistakes we made in past wars, we are accused of failing to adapt to emerging
realities. When we shift our eyes toward the future, the critics quickly tell us
that weÂ’ve forgotten our history and we are therefore doomed to repeat it. If
we somehow manage to assimilate both past lessons and emerging threats, weÂ’re
informed that we lack focus.
Where does it come from: This default assumption that we are doing the wrong
thing, no matter what we happen to be doing? How did our military wind up in
a zero-sum game? We can prevail on the field of battle, but we canÂ’t win a
war of words where the overriding assumption is that we are always in the
wrong.
I canÂ’t think of a single point in history where our forces were of the
correct size, the correct composition, correctly deployed, and appropriately
trained all at the same time. Pick a war, any war. (For that matter, pick any
period of peace.) Then dig up as many official and unofficial historical
documents, reports, reconstructions, and commentaries as you can. For every unbiased
account you uncover, youÂ’ll find three commentaries by revisionist
historians who cannot wait to tell you how badly the U.S. military bungled things.
To hear the naysayers tell it, we could take lessons in organization and
leadership from the Keystone Cops.
We really only have one defense against this sort of mudslinging.
Success. When we fight, we win, and thatÂ’s got to count for something.
When asked to comment on Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. ArmyÂ’s Lieutenant
General Tom Kelly reportedly said, “Iraq went from the fourth-largest army in
the world, to the second-largest army in Iraq in
100 hours.” In my opinion, it’s hard to argue with that kind of success, but
critics werenÂ’t phased by it. Because no matter how well we fought, we did
it with the wrong Army.
IÂ’d like to close with an invitation to those journalists, analysts, experts
and politicians who sit up at night dreaming up new ways to criticize our
armed forces. The next time you see a man or woman in uniform, stop for ten
seconds and reflect upon how much you owe that person, and his or her fellow
Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, and Airmen.
Then say, “Thank you.” I’m betting you won’t even have to explain the
reason. Our Service members are not blind or stupid. They know what theyÂ’re
risking. They know what theyÂ’re sacrificing. TheyÂ’ve weighed their wants, their
needs, and their personal safety against the needs of their nation, and made the
decision to serve. They know that they deserve our gratitude, even if they
rarely receive it.
Two words — that’s all I ask. “Thank you.” If that’s too hard, if you can’t
bring yourself to acknowledge the dedication, sincerity and sacrifice of
your defenders, then I have a backup plan for you.
Put on a uniform and show us how to do it right.
On the 22nd of July, Admiral Mike Mullin became the Chief of Naval
Operations. Below is his speech.
Subject: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS SPEECH
AmericaÂ’s military can win wars. WeÂ’ve done it in the past, and I have
absolute confidence that weÂ’ll continue to do it in the future. WeÂ’ve won fights
in which we possessed overwhelming technological superiority (Desert Storm), as
well as conflicts in which we were the technical underdogs (the American
Revolution). WeÂ’ve crossed swords with numerically superior foes, and with
militaries a fraction of the size of our own. WeÂ’ve battled on our own soil, and
on the soil of foreign lands — on the sea, under the sea, and in the skies.
WeÂ’ve even engaged in a bit of cyber-combat, way out there on the electronic
frontier. At one time or another, weÂ’ve done battle under just about every
circumstance imaginable, armed with everything from muskets to cruise missiles.
And, somehow, weÂ’ve managed to do it all with the wrong Army.
ThatÂ’s right, America has the wrong Army. I donÂ’t know how it happened, but
it did. We have the wrong Army. ItÂ’s too small; itÂ’s not deployed properly;
itÂ’s inadequately trained, and it doesnÂ’t have the right sort of logistical
support. ItÂ’s a shambles. I have no idea how those guys even manage to fight.
Now, before my brothers and sisters of the OD green persuasion get their fur
up, I have another revelation for you.
We also have the wrong Navy. And if you want to get down to brass tacks,
weÂ’ve got the wrong Air Force, the wrong Marine Corps, and the wrong Coast Guard.
DonÂ’t believe me? Pick up a newspaper or turn on your television.
In the past week, IÂ’ve watched or read at least a dozen commentaries on the
strength, size, and deployment of our military forces. All of our uniform
services get called on the carpet for different reasons, but our critics
unanimously agree that weÂ’re doing pretty much everything wrong.
I think itÂ’s sort of a game. The critics wonÂ’t tell you what the game is
called, so I’ve taken the liberty of naming it myself. I call it the ‘No Right
AnswerÂ’ game. ItÂ’s easy to play, and it must be a lot of fun because politicos
and journalists canÂ’t stop playing it.
IÂ’ll teach you the rules. HereÂ’s Rule #1: No matter how the U.S.
military is organized, itÂ’s the wrong force. Actually, thatÂ’s the only rule
in this game. We donÂ’t really need any other rules, because that one applies
in all possible situations. Allow me to demonstrateÂ…
If the Air ForceÂ’s fighter jets are showing their age, critics will tell us
that Air Force leaders are mismanaging their assets, and endangering the
safety of their personnel. If the Air Force attempts to procure new fighter jets,
they are shopping for toys and that money could be spent better elsewhere.
Are you getting the hang of the game yet? ItÂ’s easy; keeping old planes is the
wrong answer, but getting new planes is also the wrong answer. There is no
right answer, not ever.
IsnÂ’t that fun?
It works everywhere. When the Army is small, itÂ’s TOO small. Then we
start to hear phrases like ‘over-extended’ or ’spread too thin,’ and the
integrity of our national defense is called into question. When the Army is
large, itÂ’s TOO large, and itÂ’s an unnecessary drain on our economy. Terms like
‘dead weight,’ and ‘dead wood’ get thrown around.
I know what youÂ’re thinking. We could build a medium-sized Army, and
everyone would be happy. Think again. A medium-sized Army is too small to deal with
large scale conflicts, and too large to keep military spending properly
muzzled. The naysayers will attack any middle of the road solution anyway, on the
grounds that it lacks a coherent strategy.
So small is wrong, large is wrong, and medium-sized is also wrong. Now
youÂ’re starting to understand the game. Is this fun, or what?
No branch of the military is exempt. When the Navy builds aircraft carriers,
we are told that we really need small, fast multipurpose ships. When the
Navy builds small, fast multi-mission ships (aka the Arleigh Burke class), weÂ’re
told that blue water ships are poorly suited for littoral combat, and we
really need brown water combat ships. The NavyÂ’s answer, the Littoral Combat,
isnÂ’t even off the drawing boards yet, and the critics are already calling it
pork barrel politics and questioning the need for such technology. Now IÂ’ve
gone nose-to-nose with hostiles in the littoral waters of the Persian Gulf, and
I canÂ’t recall that pork or politics ever entered into the conversation. In
fact, IÂ’d have to say that the people trying to kill me and my shipmates were
positively disinterested in the internal wranglings of our military
procurement process. But, had they been aware of our organizational folly, they could
have hurled a few well-timed criticisms our way, to go along with the mines
we were trying to dodge.
The fun never stops when we play the ‘No Right Answer’ game. If we
centralize our military infrastructure, the experts tell us that we are vulnerable to
attack. WeÂ’re inviting another Pearl Harbor. If we decentralize our
infrastructure, weÂ’re sloppy and overbuilt, and the BRAC experts break out the
calculators and start dismantling what they call our excess physical capacity.Â’ If
we leave our infrastructure unchanged, we are accused of becoming stagnant in
a dynamic world environment.
Even the lessons of history are not sacrosanct. When we learn from the
mistakes we made in past wars, we are accused of failing to adapt to emerging
realities. When we shift our eyes toward the future, the critics quickly tell us
that weÂ’ve forgotten our history and we are therefore doomed to repeat it. If
we somehow manage to assimilate both past lessons and emerging threats, weÂ’re
informed that we lack focus.
Where does it come from: This default assumption that we are doing the wrong
thing, no matter what we happen to be doing? How did our military wind up in
a zero-sum game? We can prevail on the field of battle, but we canÂ’t win a
war of words where the overriding assumption is that we are always in the
wrong.
I canÂ’t think of a single point in history where our forces were of the
correct size, the correct composition, correctly deployed, and appropriately
trained all at the same time. Pick a war, any war. (For that matter, pick any
period of peace.) Then dig up as many official and unofficial historical
documents, reports, reconstructions, and commentaries as you can. For every unbiased
account you uncover, youÂ’ll find three commentaries by revisionist
historians who cannot wait to tell you how badly the U.S. military bungled things.
To hear the naysayers tell it, we could take lessons in organization and
leadership from the Keystone Cops.
We really only have one defense against this sort of mudslinging.
Success. When we fight, we win, and thatÂ’s got to count for something.
When asked to comment on Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. ArmyÂ’s Lieutenant
General Tom Kelly reportedly said, “Iraq went from the fourth-largest army in
the world, to the second-largest army in Iraq in
100 hours.” In my opinion, it’s hard to argue with that kind of success, but
critics werenÂ’t phased by it. Because no matter how well we fought, we did
it with the wrong Army.
IÂ’d like to close with an invitation to those journalists, analysts, experts
and politicians who sit up at night dreaming up new ways to criticize our
armed forces. The next time you see a man or woman in uniform, stop for ten
seconds and reflect upon how much you owe that person, and his or her fellow
Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, and Airmen.
Then say, “Thank you.” I’m betting you won’t even have to explain the
reason. Our Service members are not blind or stupid. They know what theyÂ’re
risking. They know what theyÂ’re sacrificing. TheyÂ’ve weighed their wants, their
needs, and their personal safety against the needs of their nation, and made the
decision to serve. They know that they deserve our gratitude, even if they
rarely receive it.
Two words — that’s all I ask. “Thank you.” If that’s too hard, if you can’t
bring yourself to acknowledge the dedication, sincerity and sacrifice of
your defenders, then I have a backup plan for you.
Put on a uniform and show us how to do it right.